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I. INTRODUCTION 
When Stevan Dozier was released from incarceration after fifteen 
years, he “tried not to look at the prison behind him.”1 Instead, he ran 
forward toward his wife, Lillian, and graciously thanked her for support-
ing him during his incarceration.2 
After graduating from high school in 1979, “Dozier began getting 
into trouble and abusing” cocaine.3 As his drug addiction worsened, he 
became increasingly desperate to support his habit. As a result, “he was 
arrested after punching a woman during a purse snatching” in 1986 and 
arrested again for the same crime in 1988.4 Each purse snatching consti-
tuted a second-degree robbery conviction.5 Then, in February 1994, 
Dozier pushed down a sixty-nine-year-old woman and grabbed her purse, 
which resulted in his third second-degree robbery conviction.6 He was 
subsequently sentenced to life in prison without parole, pursuant to 
Washington State’s Persistent Offender Accountability Act (POAA), 
commonly referred to as the “three strikes” law. 
Under the POAA, second-degree robbery is considered a “strike of-
fense.”7 In Washington, strike offenses include a variety of crimes8 from 
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 1. Jennifer Sullivan, Freed 3-Strikes Offender is Being Watched Closely by Supporters, Crit-
ics, SEATTLE TIMES, June 11, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/politics/2009325750_thre
estrikes11m.html. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. State v. Dozier, No. 35368-3-I, 1998 WL 130098, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1998). 
 7. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(o) (2011). 
 8. Strike offenses include: 
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first-degree promoting prostitution9 to first-degree manslaughter.10 Under 
the POAA, once an offender has three separate convictions of crimes 
considered strike offenses, the offender receives a mandatory sentence of 
life without parole.11 Essentially, as in its baseball namesake, under the 
POAA, three strikes and an offender is out. In 1993, the Washington 
State legislature adopted this three strikes policy to “[r]educe the number 
of serious, repeat offenders by tougher sentencing.”12 This reasoning is 
grounded in the notion that repeat offenders commit a “disproportionate-
ly high volume of violent crimes.”13 For example, at the time of the 
POAA’s adoption, nearly 50% of the criminals convicted in Washington 
had prior criminal histories.14 
“During [Dozier’s fifteen] years in prison, he held down a number 
of jobs, attended drug and alcohol counseling, and joined the ‘Concerned 
Lifers,’ a group of men serving life sentences who convene to discuss 
social issues.”15 Dozier’s behavior in prison while serving a life sentence 
without parole earned him the support of King County Prosecutor Dan 
Satterberg, the judge who sentenced him to prison Brian Gain, and con-
servative talk-show host and three strikes coauthor John Carlson.16 After 
Dozier spent years waiting and hoping, Washington Governor Christine 
Gregoire granted him clemency “based upon the length of his sentence, 
                                                                                                                       
Assault in the second degree; assault of a child in the second degree; child molestation in 
the second degree; controlled substance homicide; extortion in the first degree; incest 
when committed against a child under age fourteen; indecent liberties; kidnapping in the 
second degree; leading organized crime; manslaughter in the first degree; manslaughter 
in the second degree; promoting prostitution in the first degree; rape in the third degree; 
robbery in the second degree; sexual exploitation; vehicular assault when caused by the 
operation or driving of a vehicle by a person while under the influence of intoxicating 
liquor or any drug or by the operation or driving of a vehicle in a reckless manner; vehi-
cular homicide, when proximately caused by the driving of any vehicle by any person 
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or any drug as defined by RCW 
46.61.502 or by the operation of any vehicle in a reckless manner; any other class B felo-
ny offense with a finding of sexual motivation; and any other felony with a deadly wea-
pon verdict under RCW 9.94A.602. 
Id. §§ (a)–(t) (internal numbering omitted). 
 9. “A person is guilty of promoting prostitution in the first degree if he or she knowingly ad-
vances prostitution by compelling a person by threat or force to engage in prostitution or profits from 
prostitution which results from such threat or force.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.88.070(1) (2011). 
 10. “A person is guilty of manslaughter in the first degree when: (a) He recklessly causes the 
death of another person; or (b) He intentionally and unlawfully kills an unborn quick child by inflict-
ing any injury upon the mother of such child.” WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.32.060(1) (2011). 
 11. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011). 
 12. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555(2)(b) (2011). 
 13. Edwin Meese, Three-Strikes Laws Punish and Protect, 7 FED. SENT’G REP. 58, 58 (1994). 
 14. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555(1)(b) (2011). 
 15. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
 16. Id. 
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the crime he committed, and his behavior in prison.”17 Dozier is the first 
“three-strikes offender to be granted clemency” in Washington.18 
Following Dozier’s release in May 2009, two more three strikes li-
fers have been recommended for conditional clemency.19 Both Al-
Kareem Shadeed and Michael Lee Bridges have spent fifteen years in 
prison, and for both, attempting to steal a wallet was their third strike 
offense that earned them a life sentence.20 Like Dozier, both men are 
former drug addicts21 who have now become model prisoners. 
Shadeed, now forty, was twenty-four when he was sentenced to life 
in prison after attempting to steal a wallet from a high-school teacher.22 
His prior strike convictions consisted of robbery, the first for $2 and the 
second for less than $150.23 According to Shadeed’s attorney, the victim 
of his third strike offense told Shadeed’s trial judge that “a life sentence 
was a waste of the young man’s life.”24 Within his first year of incarcera-
tion, Shadeed earned his high school diploma.25 Additionally, he “took 
classes in writing and business, . . . consistently attended Narcotics Ano-
nymous meetings, and participated in a series of programs that brings 
victims and offenders together.”26 
Similar to Shadeed, Bridges, now forty-eight, was “an alcoholic and 
cocaine addict in 1994” when he attempted “to steal a man’s wallet that 
would have netted him $48.”27 He grabbed the victim’s wallet and 
pushed him away with sufficient force to constitute second-degree rob-
bery.28 Bridges had previously been convicted of second-degree robbery 
in 1987 and 1989—before the POAA was even enacted.29 Accordingly, 
his 1994 attempt was his third strike because the POAA is retroactive 
                                                     
 17. Jennifer Sullivan, Clemency Recommended for 3-Strikes Offender, SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 
11, 2008, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2008496057_webthreestrikes11m.html 
(modified on May 8, 2009). 
 18. Sullivan, supra note 1; see also Kim Murphy, Washington State Revisits Three-Strikes 
Law, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 11, 2009, http://articles.latimes.com/2009/aug/11/nation/na-three-strikes11 
(Dozier is also “the first three-strikes lifer in the nation to be pardoned.”). 
 19. Sara Jean Green, Clemency Recommended for 3-Strikes Offenders, SEATTLE TIMES, 
June 12, 2009, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2009330285_threestrikes12m.html. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Shadeed “tried to grab [the victim], threatened to kill him, and demanded money.” State v. 
Shadeed, No. 35647-0-I, 1997 WL 288995, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. May 27, 1997). When the victim 
yelled out for help, Shadeed lied and said “he had a gun and would kill him.” Id. When a car came 
down the street, Shadeed ran away. Id.; see also Green, supra note 19. 
 23. Shadeed, 1997 WL 288995, at *5. 
 24. Green, supra note 19. 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. Id. 
 28. State v. Bridges, 91 Wash. App. 102, 103, 955 P.2d 833, 834 (1998). 
 29. Green, supra note 19. 
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and includes crimes committed prior to its enactment.30 “Since being sen-
tenced to life in prison, Bridges has undergone drug and alcohol treat-
ment, become a Christian and worked to be a good father to his now-16-
year-old son . . . .”31 
For each of these men, his third and final strike was second-degree 
robbery.32 “None of the three men used weapons or caused serious injury 
to their victims.”33 Without the application of the POAA, these defen-
dants would have served between fifteen months and ten years in prison 
for their third second-degree robbery convictions.34 But because second-
degree robbery has been categorized as a “most serious offense” for the 
purposes of the POAA, these men were sentenced to life in prison with-
out parole—the same sentence that Gary Ridgway, the Green River Kill-
er, received after pleading guilty to forty-nine murders.35 
The Washington State legislature should remove second-degree 
robbery as a final strike because of the large sentencing disparity be-
tween the POAA’s mandatory sentence of life without parole versus the 
Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission’s sentencing range 
for this offense. But second-degree robbery should remain as a first or 
second strike offense to serve the goal of deterrence, and failing that, to 
ensure the incarceration of offenders whose crimes escalate in violence. 
This Comment begins by discussing the history of three strikes leg-
islation both nationally and in Washington State and explains why three 
strikes laws became popular in the mid-1990s. Part II also addresses the 
elements and sentencing of second-degree robbery under Washington’s 
current sentencing structure. Part III provides an overview of the sen-
tencing process in Washington State, including the background of the 
Washington Sentencing Guidelines Commission and its goals; the role of 
both the governor and the Washington State Clemency and Pardons 
Board in granting clemency; and the severity of life in prison without 
parole. Part IV addresses why the POAA should be amended to better 
align with the reality of how Washington prosecutors use second-degree 
robbery as a strike offense. Part IV also assesses the disconnect between 
the outcomes and the goals behind three strikes laws, and the politics 
                                                     
 30. WASH. REV. CODE 9.94A.030(31)(u) (2011). 
 31. Green, supra note 19. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. ST. OF WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMM’N, ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
III-196 (2008) [hereinafter ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES]. 
 35. Natalie Singer, If Ridgway Got Life, Would Anyone Get Death?, SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 31, 
2007, http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2003548923_deathpenalty31m.html. Since 
Ridgway’s plea deal in 2003, he pleaded guilty to a forty-ninth murder. Jennifer Sullivan, Green 
River killer Ridgway pleads guilty to 49th murder, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 18, 2011, 
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/2014272411_ridgeway19m.html. 
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behind criminal sentencing legislation including Washington State Se-
nate Bill 5292 and Senate Bill 5236. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Three strikes legislation became increasingly popular in the mid-
1990s. This Part first outlines the reasons behind the widespread emer-
gence of three strikes legislation during this time. Next, this Part dis-
cusses how and why three strikes legislation was adopted in Washington 
State as well as the goals behind the legislation. Finally, this Part con-
cludes by discussing the elements and sentencing of second-degree rob-
bery in Washington State. 
A. The Emergence of Three Strikes Laws 
1. Three Strikes Legislation Nationally 
During the early 1990s, three strikes legislation was publicized as 
“a new way to fight crime in America.”36 But prior to the 1990s, many 
states had already enacted laws similar to three strikes laws called “habi-
tual offender” laws.37 For example, Washington State had a Habitual 
Criminal Statute38 that became ineffective after the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1981.39 The main difference between a habitual criminal statute 
and a three strikes law is semantic. For example, a habitual criminal sta-
tute focuses on the “status” of the criminal if he commits a certain num-
ber of crimes; the status as a “habitual criminal” is what determines his 
punishment. Conversely, a three strikes law may refer to the offender as 
                                                     
 36. Meredith McClain, Note, “Three Strikes and You’re Out:” The Solution to the Repeat 
Offender Problem?, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 97, 101 (1996). 
 37. Id. 
 38. The statute stated: 
Every person convicted in this state of any crime of which fraud or intent to defraud is an 
element, or of petit larceny, or of any felony, who shall previously have been convicted, 
whether in this state or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of this state would 
amount to a felony, or who shall previously have been twice convicted, whether in this 
state or elsewhere, of petit larceny, or of any misdemeanor or gross misdemeanor of 
which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, shall be adjudged to be an habitual crimi-
nal and shall be punished by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for not less than ten 
years. Every person convicted in this state of any crime of which fraud or intent to de-
fraud is an element, or of petit larceny, or of any felony, who shall previously have been 
twice convicted, whether in this state or elsewhere, of any crime which under the laws of 
this state would amount to a felony, or who shall previously have been four times con-
victed, whether in this state or elsewhere, of petit larceny, or of any misdemeanor or 
gross misdemeanor of which fraud or intent to defraud is an element, shall be punished 
by imprisonment in the state penitentiary for life. 
WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.090 (1909). 
 39. Washington’s Habitual Criminal Statute, RCW 9.92.090, is not applicable to crimes com-
mitted on or after July 1, 1984. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.92.900 (2011). 
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being habitual, or “persistent” as in Washington, but shifts the focus 
from status to the number of crimes the offender commits. 
In 1993, Washington was the first state in the nation to adopt a 
three strikes law, the POAA.40 The POAA was “modeled after and more 
narrowly drafted than Washington’s habitual criminal statute,” 41 which 
applied after the third conviction of any felony. Subsequently, between 
1993 and 1995, twenty-four states and the federal government42 adopted 
similar three strikes laws.43 
Three strikes legislation is rooted in the notion that repeat offend-
ers, “who represent a relatively small component of the offender popula-
tion, commit a disproportionately high volume of violent crimes.”44 For 
example, three strikes supporters often rely on federal statistics that show 
“6 percent of criminals commit about 70 percent of all crimes.”45 Hence, 
crime rates should decrease if these persistent offenders are imprisoned 
for a lengthy amount of time.46 Additionally, proponents of three strikes 
laws hope that offenders will be less likely to commit a crime when they 
know the punishment could increase.47 A potential deterrent effect exists 
when a person is convicted of a strike offense because both his counsel 
and the sentencing judge will inform him of the consequences of later 
strike-offense convictions. Proponents argue this deterrent effect will 
reduce crime rates.48 But those offenders whose two prior strike convic-
tions occurred before the POAA,49 like Dozier, Bridges, and Shadeed, 
could not have been notified of the possible sentence that would result 
from a third strike-offense conviction.50 
                                                     
 40. Michael Vitiello, Three Strikes Laws: A Real or Imagined Deterrent to Crime?, A.B.A. 
HUM. RTS. MAG., Spring 2002, at 3. 
 41. State v. Dozier, No. 35368-3-I, 1998 WL 130098, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1998). 
 42. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c). 
 43. Thomas B. Marvell & Carlisle E. Moody, The Lethal Effects of Three-Strikes Laws, 30 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 89, 89 (2001). 
 44. Meese, supra note 13. 
 45. Timothy Egan, A 3-Strike Law Shows It’s Not as Simple as It Seems, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 
1994, http://www.nytimes.com/1994/02/15/us/a-3-strike-law-shows-it-s-not-as-simple-as-it-
seems.html?pagewanted=1. 
 46. Kent Scheidegger & Michael Rushford, The Social Benefits of Confining Habitual Crimi-
nals, 11 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 59, 59 (1999). 
 47. Marvell & Moody, supra note 43, at 90. 
 48. Scheidegger & Rushford, supra note 46, at 60. 
 49. If a defendant who committed a Class B felony that was a strike offense spends at least ten 
consecutive years in the community after release from prison without committing another strike 
offense, then the prior conviction is “washed out” and does not count toward the defendant’s offend-
er score. State v. Failey, 165 Wash.2d 673, 678, 201 P.3d 328, 330 (2009); see also WASH. REV. 
CODE § 9.94A.525(2)(b) (2011). 
 50. The Court of Appeals of Washington Division I held that despite this lack of warning, the 
POAA did not violate the ex post facto clause of either the United States or Washington State Con-
stitutions because the POAA is only triggered upon the defendant’s third conviction, which occurred 
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The surge of three strikes laws across the United States in the early 
1990s occurred, in large part, in response to the murder of twelve-year-
old Polly Klaas. On October 1, 1993, Klaas was kidnapped from her 
home in Petaluma, California, and brutally murdered.51 At the time of her 
kidnapping, Klaas was in her bedroom with two of her friends who were 
spending the night for a sleepover.52 Her admitted killer,53 Richard Allen 
Davis, had a long criminal history that included two prior kidnapping 
convictions.54 Davis had served only half of his most recent sixteen-year 
sentence for kidnapping, assault, and burglary.55 If he had served his en-
tire sentence, Davis would have been in prison the day he kidnapped 
Klaas.56 “Klaas’s murder galvanized support for the three strikes initia-
tive”57 in California. “Shortly thereafter, people all over the United States 
began demanding their legislatures pass tougher crime bills,”58 and legis-
latures responded with three strikes legislation. 
Three strikes laws differ across the nation. For example, Califor-
nia’s law is broader than Washington’s regarding how a person can ob-
tain three strikes. In Washington, each offense must be from the strike-
offense list. In contrast, in California, “only the first two convictions 
need be from the state’s list of ‘strikeable’ offenses [and] any subsequent 
felony counts as a third strike”59 making the law far broader than Wash-
ington’s. Nevertheless, the length of incarceration is less severe in Cali-
fornia: twenty-five years to life in prison,60 compared to life without pa-
role in Washington.61 But by including any felony as a third strike, Cali-
fornia’s broad three strikes law has led to some controversial results.62 
For example, in one case, the defendant’s third strike consisted of steal-
                                                                                                                       
after the POAA had passed. State v. Angehrn, 90 Wash. App. 339, 343–44, 952 P.2d 195, 197 
(1998). 
 51. People v. Davis, 208 P.3d 78, 96, 99 (Cal. 2009). The jury found Davis guilty of first-
degree murder, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, and an attempted lewd act against a child. Id. at 94. 
 52. Id. at 95–96. 
 53. The defense conceded that the defendant had killed Klaas, but asserted that the evidence 
did not show that he sexually assaulted her. Id. at 102. 
 54. Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 14 (2003); see also Davis, 208 P.3d at 102–03. 
 55. Ewing, 538 U.S. at 14–15. 
 56. Id. at 15. 
 57. Id. 
 58. McClain, supra note 36, at 99. 
 59. John Clark, James Austin & D. Alan Henry, ‘Three Strikes and You’re Out:’ Are Repeat 
Offender Laws Having Their Anticipated Effects?, 81 JUDICATURE 144, 145–46 (1998). 
 60. CAL. PENAL CODE § 667(e)(2)(A) (West 2010). 
 61. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.570 (2011). 
 62. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 18–20 (third strike consisted of stealing three golf clubs); 
Lockyear v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 66–68 (2003) (third strike consisted of stealing $150.00 worth of 
videotapes); People v. Drew, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 319, 321 (Ct. App. 1995) (third strike consisted of 
possessing codeine). 
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ing a piece of pizza.63 Even Klaas’s father expressed shock at the “small 
time crooks” who were striking out under the law,64 stating, “I’ve had my 
car broken into and my radio stolen and I’ve had my daughter murdered, 
and I know the difference.”65 Despite the debatable outcomes, the United 
States Supreme Court has held that California’s broad three strikes law 
“does not violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment.”66 
2. Three Strikes Legislation in Washington State 
Similar to California’s reaction to the Polly Klaas murder, “Wash-
ington was reeling from a series of horrific crimes committed by repeat 
offenders when voters passed the” POAA.67 Early supporters of the 
POAA consisted of Helen Harlow “whose 7-year-old son had been 
raped, choked, and sexually mutilated in 1989 by a man who had been 
assaulting children for 24 years, and Ida Ballasoites, whose daughter was 
abducted and murdered in 1988 while walking from her office to her car 
in downtown Seattle by a man” twice jailed for sexual assault.68 
In reaction to these crimes, on November 2, 1993, “voters in Wash-
ington approved the first three-strikes statute in the nation by a 3:1 mar-
gin.”69 Voters intended to “[i]mprove public safety by placing the most 
dangerous criminals in prison” and to ensure punishments proportionate 
“to both the seriousness of the crime and the [offender’s] prior criminal 
history.”70 The POAA became effective on December 2, 1993, and 
amends the Washington Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 to define a new 
type of offender, the “persistent offender,”71 and a new type of offense, 
the “most serious offense,” commonly referred to as a strike offense. 
                                                     
 63. 25 Years for a Slice of Pizza, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1995, http://www.nytimes.com/1995/03/
05/us/25-years-for-a-slice-of-pizza.html?scp=1&sq=%2225%20Years%20for%20a%20Slice% 
20of%20Pizza%22&st=cse. The defendant stole a piece of pepperoni pizza from a group of children 
at Redondo Beach, CA. He had prior convictions for robbery, attempted robbery, drug possession, 
and unauthorized use of a vehicle. Id. His sentence of twenty-five years to life was later reduced to 
six years. Jerry Dewayne Williams, 3rd Strike Theft of a Slice of Pizza, Sentence: 25 Years to Life, 
Reduced to 6, THREE STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT: STOP REPEAT OFFENDERS, http://www.three 
strikes.org/calaw01.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2011). 
 64. McClain, supra note 36, at 118 n.96. 
 65. Jennifer Edwards Walsh, “In the Furtherance of Justice”: The Effect of Discretion on the 
Implementation of California’s Three Strikes Law, THREE STRIKES & YOU’RE OUT 12 (1999), 
http://www.threestrikes.org/JEWalsh.pdf. 
 66. See Ewing, 538 U.S. at 28–31. 
 67. Murphy, supra note 18. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Francis T. Cullen, Bonnie S. Fisher & Brandon K. Applegate, Public Opinion About Pu-
nishment and Corrections, 27 CRIME & JUST. 1, 38 (2000). 
 70. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.555(1)(c), (2)(a) (2011). 
 71. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36) (2011). 
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For a defendant to be a three strikes persistent offender, he must sa-
tisfy several requirements.72 First, the defendant must be convicted of 
any felony in Washington considered a strike offense.73 Second, the de-
fendant must have previously been convicted of a strike offense at least 
twice before.74 Third, “at least one of the prior convictions must have 
occurred before the commission of any of the other most serious of-
fenses.”75 “In other words, the sequence must be: first offense, first con-
viction; second offense, second conviction; third offense, third convic-
tion.”76 
The POAA applies retroactively, so any strike-offense conviction 
prior to December 2, 1993, comparable to a most serious offense on the 
strike list counts as a strike offense.77 Furthermore, any “out-of-state and 
federal convictions with titles different than, but conduct similar to,” a 
listed strike offense also counts.78 
B. Second-Degree Robbery in Washington State 
The POAA lists over twenty strike offenses including second-
degree robbery.79 Not every state includes second-degree robbery as a 
strike offense.80 In Washington, a person commits robbery if he “takes 
personal property from the person of another or in his presence against 
his will by the use or threatened use of immediate force, violence, or fear 
of injury to that person or his property or the person or property of any-
one.”81 A person commits first-degree robbery when, “in commission of 
                                                     
 72. 13 ROYCE A. FERGUSON, JR., WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CRIMINAL PRACTICE & 
PROCEDURE § 3514 (3d ed. 2010–2011). 
 73. See supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 74. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36)(a)(ii) (2011). 
 75. See 13 FERGUSON, JR., supra note 72, § 3514. 
 76. Id. 
 77. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(u) (2011); see also supra note 49 and accompanying 
text. 
 78. Daniel W. Stiller, Note/Comment, Initiative 593: Washington’s Voters Go Down Swinging, 
30 GONZ. L. REV. 433, 435 (1995); WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(u) (2011). 
 79. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31)(o) (2011); see also supra note 8 and accompanying 
text. 
 80. See infra Appendix A. Although most states do include a crime equivalent to second-
degree robbery in their habitual offender statutes, many of these states do not have such lengthy 
sentences as Washington. For example, in North Dakota, the maximum term of imprisonment is ten 
years for a conviction equivalent to second-degree robbery when the offender has two prior offenses. 
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09(2) (2009). In Rhode Island, the court may sentence a habitual of-
fender to an additional sentence with a maximum of twenty-five years. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 
(2010). 
 81. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.190 (2011). Additionally: 
Such force or fear must be used to obtain or retain possession of the property, or to pre-
vent or overcome resistance to the taking; in either of which cases the degree of force is 
immaterial. Such taking constitutes robbery whenever it appears that, although the taking 
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the robbery or immediate flight therefrom, he or she is armed with a 
deadly weapon, displays what appears to be a firearm or deadly weapon, 
inflicts bodily injury, or commits robbery against a financial institu-
tion.”82 A person commits second-degree robbery in Washington if “he 
commits a robbery.”83 In other words, first-degree robbery includes the 
element of possession of a deadly weapon or infliction of bodily injury 
whereas second-degree robbery does not. This added element is based on 
the theory that the dangerousness level of a crime elevates exponentially 
when a weapon is involved, even if the weapon is not used. 
Second-degree robbery is a Class B felony84 along with many other 
three strikes offenses.85 According to the Washington State Sentencing 
Guidelines, the mandatory prison sentence after one second-degree rob-
bery conviction is twelve to fourteen months.86 The minimum prison sen-
tence after three separate second-degree robbery convictions is fifteen to 
twenty months.87 For an attempt conviction, the offender would receive 
75% of the sentencing range for the completed crime.88 In Washington, 
the maximum sentence for all Class B felonies, including second-degree 
robbery, is ten years89—far from the mandatory sentence of life without 
parole when this crime is considered a strike offense.90 
III. SENTENCING AND CLEMENCY IN WASHINGTON STATE 
Removing second-degree robbery as a final strike will lead to more 
consistent results under Washington’s sentencing and clemency struc-
ture. First, this Part outlines the sentencing policy under the Washington 
State Sentencing Guidelines Commission. Second, this Part describes the 
difficult clemency process in Washington and the role of both the gover-
                                                                                                                       
was fully completed without the knowledge of the person from whom taken, such know-
ledge was prevented by the use of force or fear. 
Id. 
 82. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.200(1) (2011). 
 83. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.56.210 (2011). 
 84. Id. 
 85. Class B felonies on Washington’s three strikes list include second-degree assault; assault of 
a child in the second degree; child molestation; child molestation in the second degree; indecent 
liberties, unless committed by forcible compulsion, which increases the charge to a Class A felony; 
kidnapping in the second degree, unless there is a finding of sexual motivation, which increases the 
charge to Class A felony; manslaughter in the second degree; and promoting prostitution in the 
second degree. See WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31), (36)(b)(i) (2011). 
 86. See ADULT SENTENCING GUIDELINES, supra note 34. 
 87. Id. 
 88. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.595 (2011). 
 89. WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.20.021(b) (2011). 
 90. Although beyond the scope of this Comment, the other Class B felonies listed as strike 
offenses, such as second-degree assault and second-degree manslaughter, should also be removed as 
third strike offenses because the sentencing disparity for these crimes under the POAA is the same as 
for second-degree robbery. 
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nor and the Clemency and Pardons Board in granting clemency. Addi-
tionally, it considers recent developments in Washington that further 
complicate the clemency process. Lastly, this Part examines the severity 
and effects of a life sentence without parole. 
A. The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission 
Washington is one of approximately twenty-one states with a sen-
tencing guidelines commission.91 The Washington State Sentencing 
Guidelines Commission derives its power from the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1981,92 which directs the Commission to “evaluat[e] and moni-
tor[] adult and juvenile sentencing policies and practices,” to recommend 
modifications of these policies and practices to the governor and legisla-
ture, and to provide statistics regarding adult and juvenile sentencing.93 
The Commission plays an advisory role in sentencing; however, Wash-
ington’s legislature “never delegated its power over sentencing” to the 
Commission.94 Instead, the Commission serves the “valuable role” of 
creating sentencing schemes and “providing policy advice” while the 
legislature controls sentencing policy.95 
The Washington State Sentencing Guidelines Commission designed 
the sentencing guidelines system “to ensure that offenders who commit 
similar crimes and have similar criminal histories receive equivalent sen-
tences.”96 When creating the guidelines, the Commission “ranked felo-
nies into fourteen seriousness levels and devised a scoring system for 
criminal history that assigned variable weights based on the number of 
convictions, their seriousness, the similarity of the prior conviction to the 
current offense, and the length of time between convictions.”97 When 
applying the guidelines, the first step in determining an offender’s sen-
tence is determining his offender score. For example, an offender who 
committed second-degree robbery and who has two previous felonies 
would multiply two (the number of prior felonies) by two in the “Adult 
History” section below. If the offender was not on community placement 
and did not have a juvenile history, his offender score would be four. 
                                                     
 91. NEAL B. KAUDER & BRIAN J. OSTROM, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, STATE 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES: PROFILES AND CONTINUUM 3, 4 (2008), available at 
http://www.ncsconline.org/csi/PEW-Profiles-v12-online.pdf. 
 92. Codified as RCW § 9.94A. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.020 (2011). 
 93. Powers and Duties of the Commission: Statutory Mandate, ST. OF WASH. SENT’G 
GUIDELINES COMMISSION [hereinafter Powers and Duties], http://www.sgc.wa.gov/Informational/ 
About_SGC.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2011). 
 94. David Boerner & Roxanne Lieb, Sentencing Reform in the Other Washington, 28 CRIME & 
JUST. 71, 83–84 (2001). 
 95. Id. 
 96. Powers and Duties, supra note 93. 
 97. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 86. 

















After determining the offender score, the “standard sentence range 
for an offense can be determined by referring to the felony sentencing 
‘grid’ and finding the intersection of the row identifying the seriousness 
level of the current offense and the column identifying the appropriate 
number of points in the offender’s criminal history score.”98 The standard 
sentencing range for second-degree robbery ranges from “zero” to “nine 
or more.” With an offender score of four, the offender’s standard sen-
tencing range would be fifteen to twenty months in prison. “A judge may 
impose a determinate sentence that falls within this standard range, or 
may impose an exceptional sentence with a written explanation.”99 
Washington’s sentencing “guidelines provide the external standard 
necessary to constrain [judicial] discretion” because “[t]he applicable 
sentence range is determined solely by the defendant’s crime of convic-
tion and prior criminal history.”100 “Yet the Washington reformers’ intent 
was to structure, not eliminate, judicial discretion, and thus the guide-
lines were made presumptive, not mandatory.”101 The POAA clashes 
with this intent because it removes any discretion from judges.102 Al-
ready, exceptional sentences103 “must be justified by explicit findings of 
                                                     
 98. See Powers and Duties, supra note 93. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 123, 128. 
 101. Id. at 123. 
 102. See McClain, supra note 36, at 118–19. 
 103. “Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime 
beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reason-
able doubt.” Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (applying Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000)). 
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‘substantial and compelling circumstances’ and are subject to substantive 
appellate review.”104 The POAA eliminates judicial discretion and, addi-
tionally, suggests that every time an offender commits a serious offense, 
the circumstances are equivalent, making judicial discretion unnecessary. 
In reality, even the commission of the same crime could be very different 
due to innumerable factors relating to the circumstances of the offense, 
for example, whether the victim is injured during the act of a second-
degree robbery. 
Furthermore, the POAA shifts the sentencing burden from judges to 
prosecutors,105 which contradicts the Washington sentencing guidelines’ 
paramount goal of sentencing consistency. Prosecutors have discretion 
when determining what charges to bring against a defendant, but under 
the POAA, “[i]f a person meets the definition of a persistent offender, a 
life sentence must be imposed.”106 Accordingly, if a prosecutor wishes to 
avoid a judge imposing a life sentence on a defendant with two strike 
offenses, the prosecutor must decline to file any charge that may consti-
tute a strike. The goal of Washington’s sentencing guidelines is neither to 
remove judicial discretion entirely nor to place sentencing discretion en-
tirely in the power of the prosecutor.107 But under the POAA, even if a 
judge wanted to, she lacks “the authority to depart from the mandatory 
sentence of life without the possibility of parole.”108 Though this hard-
line approach seems reasonable for some strike offenses, such as sexual 
exploitation, rape, or manslaughter, the lack of discretion can have the 
undesirable effect of imposing an overly harsh sentence on an individual 
who committed a lesser crime and who may be capable of rehabilitation 
such as Dozier. 
B. The Washington State Clemency Process 
The need for legislative intervention in eliminating second-degree 
robbery as a qualifying third strike offense is made even more apparent 
by examining Washington State’s clemency process. Petitioning for cle-
mency is a slow and arduous process that is rarely successful in Wash-
ington, particularly in recent years. 
Clemency is a broad term that includes “the power of the President 
or a governor to pardon a criminal or commute a criminal sentence.”109 A 
pardon eliminates the sentence “or other legal consequences of the 
                                                     
 104. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 128 (citing WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.535 (2001)). 
 105. Stiller, supra note 78, at 456. 
 106. State v. Bridges, 91 Wash. App. 102, 105, 955 P.2d 833, 834 (1998). 
 107. Boerner & Lieb, supra note 94, at 118, 123. 
 108. State v. Dozier, No. 35368-3-I, 1998 WL 130098, at *9 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1998). 
 109. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 107 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
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crime.”110 In contrast, when governors commute an offender’s sentence, 
they substitute “a less severe punishment for a more severe one that has 
already been judicially imposed . . . .”111 
In Washington, the governor has the sole power “to grant a pardon 
to a person convicted of a crime . . . .”112 For offenders sentenced for 
crimes committed after the implementation of the Sentencing Reform 
Act of 1981—July 1, 1984—the Clemency and Pardons Board “receives 
the petitions for pardons and for review and commutations of sentences 
and makes recommendations to the governor.”113 The Clemency and 
Pardons Board was statutorily “established as a board within the office of 
the governor.”114 “The board consists of five members appointed by the 
governor” and confirmed by the state senate.115 
The first hurdle that prisoners must overcome when seeking cle-
mency in Washington is finding representation. Washington State “does 
not provide public defenders for clemency petitioners,” and prisoners 
convicted of second-degree robbery likely have limited funds, so finding 
an attorney can be incredibly difficult.116 The prisoners who are most 
likely to afford representation are those that are supported by financially 
sound and supportive family and friends.117 Accordingly, disparity exists 
between who can afford representation and who cannot. Due to lack of 
representation, many clemency petitions are written pro se by prisoners 
lacking both legal expertise and access to legal resources. 
After a prisoner submits a clemency petition, the Clemency and 
Pardons Board reviews it and recommends to the governor whether to 
grant or deny clemency.118 The board cannot make a recommendation 
“that the governor grant clemency . . . until a public hearing has been 
held on the petition.”119 To start the process of a public hearing, a copy of 
the petition is sent to the prosecuting attorney of the county where the 
offender was convicted.120 Then, the prosecuting attorney must “make 
                                                     
 110. Id. at 520. 
 111. Id. at 120. 
 112. See 13 FERGUSON, JR., supra note 72, § 5301. 
 113. Id. 
 114. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.880(1) (2011). Additionally: 
Members of the board shall serve terms of four years and until their successors are ap-
pointed and confirmed. However, the governor shall stagger the terms by appointing one 
of the initial members for a term of one year, one for a term of two years, one for a term 
of three years, and two for terms of four years. 
Id. § (2). Members of the board do not receive compensation. Id. § (4). 
 115. Id. § (1). 
 116. Murphy, supra note 18. 
 117. Interview with Jeff Ellis, Attorney for Stevan Dozier, in Seattle, Wash. (Dec. 3, 2010). 
 118. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.885(1) (2011). 
 119. Id. § (3). 
 120. Id. 
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reasonable efforts to notify victims, survivors of victims, witnesses, and 
the law enforcement agency or agencies that conducted the investigation 
of the date and place of the hearing.”121 After the hearing, the Clemency 
and Pardons Board decides whether to recommend the petitioner for 
clemency. Clemency is rarely recommended.122  
Even if the clemency board does recommend clemency, the gover-
nor ultimately decides if it is granted.123 Placing clemency in the hands of 
the governor can lead to unpredictable outcomes because, like any politi-
cal decision,124 the likelihood that any particular governor will follow the 
Clemency and Pardons Board recommendations for clemency varies. 
Washington’s current governor, Christine Gregoire, rarely grants cle-
mency when compared to her predecessors.125 Furthermore, Governor 
Gregoire is not required to give any explanation for her decision.126 But 
on some occasions, she may encourage the prisoner to reapply for cle-
mency, which may provide some guidance for prisoners who she deter-
mines may need more rehabilitation.127 
Although Governor Gregoire has always been hesitant to grant 
clemency,128 a recent tragedy makes it less likely that she will do so in 
the future. On the early morning of November 29, 2009, Maurice Clem-
                                                     
 121. Id. 
 122. For example, Governor Gregoire was elected in 2004, and by June 2007, twenty-six pris-
oners had petitioned for clemency. The Clemency and Pardons Board only recommended to grant 
four prisoners clemency. The governor then denied three of those and approved one. Tracy Johnson, 
He Began a New Life While Still Behind Bars, Hopes for Clemency, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, 
July 22, 2007, http://www.seattlepi.com/local/324703_clemency23.html. 
 123. See 13 FERGUSON, JR., supra note 72, § 5301. Not every state places the sole clemency 
power in the office of the governor. Most states do, but, for example, Georgia’s Board of Pardons 
and Paroles makes a decision entirely independent of Georgia’s governor. Jake Armstrong, Clemen-
cy Board Keeps Its Secrets, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Sept. 14, 2008, http://www.jacksonville.com/tu-
online/stories/091408/geo_332001750.shtml. 
 124. Further complicating the issue are the drastic effects that clemency can have on a gover-
nor’s reelection. For example, Willie Horton, a convicted murderer, was not granted clemency from 
his life sentence. But in 1986 he was released for a weekend-furlough program during which time he 
raped a woman and brutally stabbed her fiancé. Then-Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis did 
not start the furlough program but he had supported it. His opponent in the 1988 presidential cam-
paign, George H.W. Bush, repeatedly brought up his support for the program in debates and an 
aggressive media campaign that many attribute to Dukakis’s loss. Nina Shapiro, Gov. Gregoire: One 
Tough Clemency Judge, SEATTLE WKLY., July 4, 2007, http://www.seattleweekly.com/2007-07-
04/news/gov-gregoire-one-tough-clemency-judge.php/3. 
 125. Robert Winsor, a former King County Superior Court and state Court of Appeals judge 
who served twelve years on the board, states, “Gov. Locke and Gov. [Mike] Lowry usually accepted 
our recommendations . . . . ‘Almost always’ might be the right word. I do think that Gov. Gregoire 
thus far has not followed our recommendations that often.” Id. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.; Johnson, supra note 122. 
 128. Governor Gregoire has only granted 26 of the 215 requests she has received while in 
office. Nina Shapiro, Gregoire to Be Even Tougher on Clemency?, SEATTLE WKLY, Dec. 2, 2009, 
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2009-12-02/news/gregoire-to-be-even-tougher-on-clemency/. 
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mons walked into a coffee shop in Lakewood, Washington, and opened 
fire on four uniformed police officers as they sat working on their lap-
tops.129 All four officers died at the scene.130 A two-day manhunt re-
vealed surprising and concerning details about Clemmons’s criminal his-
tory. Originally from Arkansas, Clemmons had a long history of commit-
ting violent crimes, “including pending felony charges of raping a 12-
year-old relative and assaulting police officers.”131 Prior to moving to 
Washington, he had been serving a ninety-five year prison sentence in 
Arkansas, but in 2000, then-Governor Mike Huckabee granted him cle-
mency after only eleven years.132 The recent murders of the four Lake-
wood police officers will undeniably increase public scrutiny of Gover-
nor Gregoire’s future decisions and serve as a reminder of the risks in-
volved when granting clemency.133 
Inarguably, clemency should not be easy for a prisoner to attain, 
otherwise the state’s sentencing structure would become moot. But when 
defendants are sentenced inconsistently or unfairly, as Dozier, Shadeed, 
and Bridges, the inability to overcome the clemency process can prevent 
them from attaining freedom after they have been rehabilitated. 
C. The Severity of Life in Prison Without Parole 
Second only to the death penalty, life without parole134 is the most 
severe sentence a court may impose.135 Both prisoners136 and scholars 
                                                     
 129. William Yardley, Tacoma Suspect Said to Threaten to Shoot Police Officers, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 30, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/200
9/12/01/us/01tacoma.htmlhttp://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/01/us/01tacoma.html. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. 
 133. Shapiro, supra note 128. For example, in December 2010, Governor Gregoire overrode 
the decision of the state parole board to release Jerry Dean Lain, who attempted to kill a Richland 
Police Officer in 1982. Jacques von Lunen, Governor Blocks Release of Convict, THE NEWS TRIB., 
Dec. 18, 2010, http://www.thenewstribune.com/2010/12/18/1470195/governor-blocks-release-of-
convict.html. 
 134. The Washington Pattern Jury Instructions on life without parole state: 
A person sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of release or parole shall 
not have that sentence suspended, deferred, or commuted by any judicial officer. The In-
determinate Sentence Review Board or its successor may not parole such prisoner nor re-
duce the period of confinement in any manner whatsoever including but not limited to 
any sort of good-time calculation. The Department of Corrections or its successor or any 
executive official may not permit such prisoner to participate in any sort of release or fur-
lough program. 
11 WASH. SUPREME COURT COMM. ON JURY INSTRUCTIONS, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: 
WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS–CRIMINAL § 31.06 (3d ed. 2010). 
 135. Catherine Appleton & Bent Grover, The Pros and Cons of Life Without Parole, 47 BRIT. 
J. CRIMINOLOGY 597, 598 (2007). 
 136. Gerald Hankerson was sentenced to life without parole at age eighteen for aggravated 
first-degree murder. On April 9, 2009, he became the first man in Washington State history to be 
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argue that life without parole may be as severe as the death penalty be-
cause “to lock up a prisoner and take away all hope of release is to resort 
to another form of the death sentence” with no goal of freedom, resocia-
lization, or repayment of debt to society.137 Instead, the goal is solely in-
capacitation. The sentence reflects society’s view that these individuals 
are so beyond rehabilitation that permanently removing them from socie-
ty is the only viable option. The severity of life imprisonment without 
parole has been recognized internationally. For example, constitutional 
courts in Germany,138 France, Italy, and Namibia, have posited that pris-
oners subjected to life sentences “have a fundamental right to be consi-
dered for release.”139 But most states, such as Washington, employ life 
without the possibility of parole as a possible sentence. 
In Washington, aggravated first-degree murder is the only crime 
that mandates140 the punishment of life without parole, which illustrates 
the harshness of this punishment. When a defendant is found guilty of 
aggravated first-degree murder, the jury first must find the defendant 
guilty of premeditated141 murder in the first degree.142 Then, the jury de-
termines whether one or more “aggravating factors” applies, for exam-
ple, if the victim was a law enforcement officer or the defendant commit-
ted the murder in order to receive money.143 The Washington State legis-
lature recognizes the severity of this crime not only by mandating life 
without parole but also by allowing capital punishment to be imposed.144 
Comparing the elements of aggravated first-degree murder, where the 
defendant intends to take a life, to second-degree robbery, where vi-
olence may be only threatened, highlights the inconsistencies in mandat-
ing life without parole for both crimes. 
                                                                                                                       
granted clemency after being sentenced to life without parole. When he was nineteen years old and 
in solitary confinement in Walla Walla State Penitentiary, he recalls the death-row inmates told him 
“I was the unlucky one; they got to die, I had to spend the rest of my life in misery in prison.” Da-
mon Agnos, In an About-Face, Gregoire Commutes Sentence, Apr. 15, 2009, SEATTLE WKLY., 
http://www.seattleweekly.com/2009-04-15/news/in-an-about-face-gregoire-commutes-sentence/. 
 137. Appleton & Grover, supra note 135, at 606, 610. 
 138. In 1977, the German Federal Constitutional Court recognized that human dignity is com-
promised if a prisoner has no hope of being released. Accordingly, there is no life imprisonment 
without parole under German law. Id. at 610. 
 139. Id. 
 140. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(1) (2011). Unless there are significant mitigating circums-
tances to merit leniency, the sentence for aggravated first-degree murder is the death penalty. Id. 
§ (2). If sufficient mitigating circumstances exist, then the sentence is life without parole. See id. 
§ (1)–(2). 
 141. “[T]he premeditation required in order to support a conviction of the crime of murder in 
the first degree must involve more than a moment in point of time.” WASH. REV. CODE 
§ 9A.32.020(1) (2011). 
 142. See WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.020 (2011). 
 143. Id. § (1), (4). 
 144. WASH. REV. CODE § 10.95.030(2) (2011). 
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In addition to sentencing inconsistency, a compelling economic ar-
gument exists for the state to reduce the number of prisoners serving life 
without parole. According to the Washington State Department of Cor-
rections, housing an offender in a Washington State prison costs nearly 
$37,000 per year.145 These costs may increase as prisoners get older be-
cause “an older inmate population will have a higher incidence of circu-
latory, respiratory, dietary, and ambulatory difficulties than younger in-
mates . . . .”146 Releasing prisoners after they have passed the age where 
they commit the most crimes could save Washington State a considerable 
amount of money. Even three strikes supporters assert that life without 
parole may be too harsh a punishment for repeat offenders because they 
often stop committing crimes in middle or advanced age.147 
IV. ELIMINATING SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY AS A FINAL STRIKE 
To ensure consistent sentencing and promote prisoner rehabilita-
tion, second-degree robbery should be removed as a third strike option. 
First, this Part discusses how Washington prosecutors have exercised 
discretion regarding second-degree robbery convictions since the adop-
tion of the POAA. The Part next addresses the disparity between the out-
comes of three strikes legislation and the policy behind it. Lastly, this 
Part examines why removing second-degree robbery entirely from the 
strike list is not a realistic option due to the politics of criminal sentenc-
ing. 
A. The Reality of Three Strikes in Washington 
Although defendants like Stevan Dozier present extreme examples 
of the shortcomings of three strikes legislation, many cases exist where 
this hard-line approach has led to the incarceration of violent and dan-
gerous repeat offenders.148 For example, Lonnie Tenant’s first two strikes 
included second-degree assault and first-degree burglary.149 His third 
strike conviction included second-degree child molestation, and second-
                                                     
 145. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
 146. Peter J. Benekos & Alida V. Merlo, Three Strikes and You’re Out!: The Political Sentenc-
ing Game, 59 FED. PROBATION 3, 7 (Mar. 1995). 
 147. One author argues the punishment should be “[twenty-five] years to life with provisions 
for release of those who have served [twenty-five] or more years if correctional officials certify they 
are no longer dangerous” in his article that promotes three strikes laws. Meese, supra note 13. 
 148. See WASH. SENT’G GUIDELINES COMMISSION, TWO-STRIKES AND THREE-STRIKES: 
PERSISTENT OFFENDER SENTENCING IN WASHINGTON STATE THROUGH JUNE 2008 (2009) [hereinaf-
ter TWO-STRIKES AND THREE-STRIKES]. 
 149. State v. Tennant, No. 28953-9-II, 2003 WL 22890423, at *8 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 2, 
2003). 
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degree rape of a thirteen-year-old.150 He is currently serving a sentence of 
life without parole under the POAA. Washington’s POAA undeniably 
protects the public from offenders such as Tenant.151 Furthermore, the 
POAA has not significantly increased the prison population, which many 
feared would be a negative result of the law.152 
Despite these positive results, use of both the POAA as well as 
second-degree robbery as a strike offense has decreased in Washington 
since the law’s 1994 implementation, most likely due to increased 
awareness of its extreme consequences.153 For example, in 1995, thirty-
seven offenders were sentenced under the POAA compared to eighteen 
in 2007.154 Also, since 1994, three strikes convictions where second-
degree robbery was the third strike have decreased considerably.155 In 
1994, Washington State prosecutors charged second-degree robbery as a 
third strike in eight of fourteen three strikes cases that resulted in life im-
prisonment.156 Currently, the last three strikes case where a second-
degree robbery conviction was the third strike was in 2005.157 In 1994 
and 1995 combined, seven offenders whose strike convictions consisted 
of three second-degree robberies were sentenced to life in prison.158 In 
comparison, since 1995, only ten offenders have been sentenced to life 
without parole under the POAA for three second-degree robbery convic-
tions.159 Additionally, in November 2005, Pierce County was the last 
prosecutor’s office to sentence a persistent offender to life in prison for 
three second-degree robbery convictions.160 In light of these statistics, it 
seems highly unlikely that defendants like Dozier, Bridges, or Shadeed 
would receive the same sentence for their crimes today that they received 
in 1994. 
The sentencing statistics reflect that prosecutors are rethinking their 
charges because of the severity of a mandated sentence of life without 
                                                     
 150. Id. 
 151. See also State v. Loggins, No. 24644-9-II, 2001 WL 789711, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. July 
13, 2001) (first strike consisted of felony assault, second strike consisted of felony assault, third 
strike consisted of first-degree murder); State v. Scherf, No. 16633-3-III, 1999 WL 44480, at *1 
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 152. Darryl K. Brown, Prosecutors and Overcriminalization: Thoughts on Political Dynamics 
and a Doctrinal Response, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 453, 458 (2009). 
 153. See TWO-STRIKES AND THREE-STRIKES, supra note 148. 
 154. Id. at 3, 7–8. 
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 158. Id. at 3. 
 159. Id. at 4–7. 
 160. Id. at 7. 
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parole. King County Prosecuting Attorney Dan Satterberg states that 
King County prosecutors “have exercised more discretion as we’ve had 
experience with the law.”161 As a result, Satterberg’s “office rarely uses 
[second-degree robbery] as a third strike.”162 Instead, King County pros-
ecutors often charge first-degree theft,163 which will not result in a life 
sentence if the defendant already has two prior strikes.164 “While Satter-
berg [] doesn’t support the removal of second-degree robbery from the 
three-strikes list,”165 he does “believe[] there are people serving a life 
sentence who should no longer be incarcerated.”166 Accordingly, he has 
asked a group of King County Senior Deputy Prosecutors “to review 
three-strikes cases filed between 1994 and 1997 to make sure the sen-
tence of life without parole fit the crime.”167 He also spoke in front of 
Washington’s Pardon and Clemency Board in support of clemency for 
Dozier, Shadeed, and Bridges.168 
Satterberg’s reflective stance exemplifies the heart of this issue—
Washington’s three strikes law was not meant for men like Dozier but 
has unjustly been applied to them. Second-degree robbery is on the 
strike-offense list with violent crimes such as rape and manslaughter, yet 
second-degree robbery often lacks the harm to victims associated with 
these crimes.169 Satterberg referred to Dozier’s second-degree robberies 
as “street robberies” that “did not cause extraordinary harm to any-
body.”170 But street robberies fall under robbery in the second degree, a 
crime where violence is only threatened but not necessarily used.171 Ad-
ditionally, three strikes supporters posit that for three strikes offenders, 
“rehabilitation is no longer working and jail is the only alternative.”172 
But offenders like Dozier prove that this theory is incorrect. 
                                                     
 161. Murphy, supra note 18. 
 162. Sullivan, supra note 1. 
 163. Theft in the first degree: 
A person is guilty of theft in the first degree if he or she commits theft of: (a) Property or 
services which exceed(s) five thousand dollars in value other than a firearm as defined in 
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 166. Sullivan, supra note 17. 
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 169. WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(31) (2011). 
 170. Murphy, supra note 18. 
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 172. McClain, supra note 36, at 125. 
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Furthermore, sentencing an offender to life without parole does not 
address the social causes of second-degree robbery. Second-degree rob-
bery is an economic crime, and money for drugs is often the cause of the 
offense,173 as was the case for Dozier, Bridges, and Shadeed.174 Low-
level, economic crimes, such as second-degree robbery, increase in times 
of economic stress like the present.175 But sentencing these offenders to 
life in prison does not prevent crime because it does not eliminate its 
causes, for example, drug addiction, poverty, or homelessness.176 The 
money the state spends on incarcerating offenders who are past the age 
where they are likely to offend could be used to create social programs to 
eliminate the causes of economic crimes such as second-degree rob-
bery.177 By continuing to apply second-degree robbery as a third and fi-
nal strike, Washington State will not eliminate second-degree robbery, 
but instead, will only increase its jail population. 
B. Disparity Between Support and Results of Three Strikes Laws 
The shift of the use of second-degree robbery as a third strike in 
King County elucidates one of the most problematic issues with three 
strikes legislation, which is a disconnect between the law and the impli-
cations of applying it. Put simply, three strikes legislation looks good on 
paper, but creates troubling results. Despite overwhelming support for 
three strikes laws,178 “it is questionable, however, whether citizens truly 
wish” for them to apply to every qualifying offender.179 
For example, in a 1995 survey in the Cincinnati area, people 
showed “extensive support” for three strikes legislation.180 But in the 
second portion of the survey, the respondents rated specific vignettes that 
included a series of three crimes “that would make the offender eligible 
for a mandatory life sentence.”181 The offenses were taken “from a three-
strikes statute then pending in the Ohio legislature.”182 While 88% of the 
sample stated they supported a three strikes law,183 “only 16.9% assigned 
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a life sentence” in the vignettes they were shown.184 Furthermore, past 
criminal record had “little, if any effect” on the respondents’ sentencing 
choices.185 Additionally, a majority of the respondents favored making 
exceptions to imposing a mandatory life sentence “when a third offense 
was relatively minor . . . .”186 
This study shows that while there may be agreement that dangerous 
people should be removed to protect society, confusion exists over who 
these offenders are and what their punishment should be.187 In Washing-
ton, the people voted to remove the “most serious offenders” from the 
streets.188 But did they know they would be incarcerating Bridges for life 
for attempting to steal a wallet?189 Did voters consider that if Washing-
ton’s three strikes legislation was approved, a man like Dozier would 
receive the same sentence as the Green River Killer? These results are 
inconsistent with the goals of both the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 
to ensure sentencing consistency, and three strikes legislation, to protect 
society from the most dangerous offenders. Strong support behind three 
strikes may be sometimes incompatible with its outcome,190 and when 
the sentence is as severe as life without the possibility of parole, this con-
flict creates immeasurable harm to offenders sentenced unfairly. 
C. The Politics of Criminal Sentencing 
Like many criminal sentencing laws, there has been debate regard-
ing three strikes legislation with specific opposition to the inclusion of 
second-degree robbery as a strike offense in Washington. For example, 
in 2009, Washington State Senator Adam Kline introduced Senate Bill 
5292,191 which would have removed second-degree robbery from the 
three strikes list.192 The Bill stated that any offender who was sentenced 
as a persistent offender would have a resentencing hearing if any of her 
three strikes convictions consisted of second-degree robbery.193 Propo-
nents of Senate Bill 5292 argued that prosecutors recognize the disparity 
between the sentencing guidelines for second-degree robbery and the 
three strikes sentence for this “low level offense that often does not in-
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volve physical harm.”194 Furthermore, although the Clemency and Par-
dons Board exists, the governor has the ultimate authority in granting 
clemency, and Bill supporters recognized “this is something that is not 
done lightly.”195 
Despite these claims, the Bill ultimately failed.196 The failure is un-
surprising because “taking a tough stance on sentencing” is often seen as 
“symbolic of doing something about crime” regardless of the actual con-
sequences.197 Essentially, politicians understand that supporting tough 
sentencing proposals works for them politically.198 In the past, crime was 
an issue associated with the Republicans, but then the Democrats rea-
lized that supporting tougher sentencing garnered them strong political 
support.199 Now, neither party wants to be soft on crime because of the 
possible disastrous campaign effects.200 Due to the divisive politics of 
criminal sentencing, removing second-degree robbery only as a final 
strike is a more realistic proposition than removing second-degree rob-
bery entirely from the strike-offense list. 
Additionally, it is unrealistic to expect the legislature to remove 
second-degree robbery from the strike-offense list entirely where a de-
fendant’s use of violence increased with each offense. For example, 
Louis Barrow fits the description of a serious offender. In 1993, he was 
convicted of first-degree robbery, and in 1987, he was convicted of at-
tempted second-degree robbery.201 In 1999, a woman contacted the po-
lice after finding a stranger, Barrow, in her home.202 Police gave chase to 
Barrow as he drove a stolen pickup truck, accelerated, ran red lights, and 
eventually collided with another driver who died at the scene.203 Barrow 
then fled the site of the fatal collision.204 He was convicted of second-
degree murder for killing the innocent driver, and this strike offense was 
his third and final.205 He is now serving life in prison without parole un-
der the POAA, but this sentence is also the statutory maximum for 
second-degree murder.206 Hence, a judge may have sentenced Barrow to 
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life in prison based on the circumstances of the offense, not the mandato-
ry sentence dictated by the POAA. 
Although Dozier’s story identifies the problems with second-degree 
robbery as a strike offense, Barrow’s conviction shows that leaving this 
crime as a strike offense will remove some of society’s repeat offenders 
whose crimes escalate in violence. Politicians will be wary of removing 
second-degree robbery entirely because there are other offenders such as 
Barrow that have been punished under the law.207 Accordingly, the goals 
of the POAA will still be attained by removing second-degree robbery 
only as a final strike. 
D. Senate Bill 5236 
Senator Kline recently introduced another bill reforming the three 
strikes law—Senate Bill 5236. If passed, the Bill would amend the 
POAA so that a persistent offender who does not have a prior or current 
Class A felony or sex offense would receive a minimum of fifteen years 
in prison208 and a maximum term of life without parole.209 After the of-
fender serves his minimum sentence, he would petition the Indeterminate 
Sentence Review Board (ISRB) 210 for conditional release. 211 In order for 
the ISRB to grant him conditional release, “the offender must prove by 
clear and convincing evidence that his or her rehabilitation is complete 
and that he or she is fit for release.”212 
If passed, Senate Bill 5236 would solve some of the problems 
created by including second-degree robbery as a strike offense. For ex-
ample, the Bill acknowledges that not all three strikes offenders deserve 
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the same sentence,213 and the opportunity to be released would provide 
incentive for inmates to rehabilitate themselves. Also, an inmate does not 
need legal representation or knowledge in order to petition to the ISRB 
because the petition only details the offender’s behavior in prison.214 
Lastly, the Bill is retroactive, so offenders who received three second-
degree robbery convictions when the POAA was initially passed could 
petition for release after they serve fifteen years. 
Despite the potential positive outcomes of Senate Bill 5236, it does 
not apply to an offender whose third strike offense is second-degree rob-
bery if he has only one Class A felony conviction. Essentially, an offend-
er will still receive life in prison for a second-degree robbery conviction. 
Under this Bill, an inmate who committed one Class A felony prior to 
1994 and one Class B felony prior to 1994, and then earned a second-
degree robbery conviction in 2011 could earn a life sentence. This out-
come does not align with the POAA’s goal of placing the most danger-
ous offenders in prison because the offender’s crimes are decreasing in 
violence. While the Bill may be drafted narrowly to increase the chance 
that it will pass,215 it does not address the sentencing disparity created by 
including second-degree robbery as a third strike. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Many who supported Stevan Dozier, such as King County Prosecu-
tor Dan Satterberg and Governor Christine Gregoire, are watching his 
progress.216 No one would condone Dozier’s past crimes, but his story 
proves that defendants sentenced to life under the POAA can be rehabili-
tated and contribute positively to society. Since being freed from prison, 
“Dozier spends his days pounding the streets—visiting politicians, com-
munity centers and school district offices in search of an opportunity to 
share his story” with young children who may be following a path of 
drugs and crime.217 Dozier also testified at the public hearing in the se-
nate committee in support of Senate Bill 5236.218 Although Dozier says 
he does not dwell on the pressure, he must know that the freedom of 
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Shadeed, Bridges, and other three strike inmates with similar conviction 
histories rests on his shoulders. 
The POAA should be amended to exclude second-degree robbery 
as a final strike. This amendment to the POAA should be retroactive to 
ensure that inmates sentenced unfairly when the POAA first passed could 
be released. The Washington Sentencing Guidelines provide adequate 
sentencing ranges for second-degree robbery, and a second-degree rob-
bery conviction where the offender has been convicted of two prior felo-
nies already carries a longer sentence based on the defendant’s offender 
score. Hence, the Guidelines already provide longer sentences for reci-
divists. 
Life without parole for a second-degree robbery conviction contra-
dicts the goal of consistent sentencing that the Washington Sentencing 
Reform Act demands and does not align with the POAA’s paramount 
objective to remove the most dangerous offenders from society. If 
passed, Senate Bill 5236 would resolve some of the sentencing dispari-
ties created by including specific Class B felonies as strike offenses, but 
it would still mandate a sentence of life without parole for a second-
degree robbery conviction if the offender had only one Class A felony 
conviction. Accordingly, the POAA should be amended so that judges 
retain discretion when sentencing a defendant whose final strike offense 





Persistent or Habitual Offender Sentencing 
in the United States 
STATES THAT INCLUDE SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY 
AS A STRIKE OFFENSE: 
Alabama – ALA. CODE § 13A-5-9 (2010) 
Arkansas – ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-4-501 (West 2010) 
California – CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (West 2010) 
Florida – FLA. STAT. ANN. § 775.084 (West 2010) 
Hawaii – HAW. REV. STAT. § 706-606.5 (West 2010) 
Idaho – IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2514 (2010) 
Indiana – IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8 (2010) 
Kansas – KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4504 (West 2010) 
Kentucky – KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 532.080 (West 2010) 
Louisiana – LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:529.1(A)(3)(b) (2010) 
Maryland – MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 14-101 (West 2010) 
Michigan – MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 769.11 (2010) 
Mississippi – MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-83 (2010) 
Missouri – MO. ANN. STAT. § 558.016 (West 2010) 
Montana – MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-501 (2009) 
Nebraska – NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2221 (2010) 
Nevada – NEV. REV. STAT. § 207.010 (West 2009) 
New Jersey – N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 44–3 (West 2011) 
New Mexico – N.M. STAT. ANN. 31-18-17 (West 2010) 
North Carolina – N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 14-7.1 (West 2010) 
North Dakota – N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-32-09 (2009) 
Pennsylvania – 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9714(a)(2) (West 2010) 
Rhode Island – R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (2010) 
South Dakota – S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 22-7-8 (2010) 
Tennessee – TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-35-107 (West 2010) 
Texas – TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42 (West 2009) 
Utah – UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-203.5 (West 2010) 
Virginia – VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-297.1 (West 2010) 
Washington –WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.030(36) (2011) 
Wyoming – WYO. STATE. ANN. § 6-10-201 (West 2010) 
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STATES THAT EXCLUDE SECOND-DEGREE ROBBERY 
AS A STRIKE OFFENSE: 
Arizona – ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-706 (2011) 
Colorado – COL. REV. STAT. ANN. § 18-1.3-801 (West 2010) 
Connecticut – CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-40 (2011) 
Georgia – GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-7 (West 2010) 
New York – N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.08 (McKinney 2010) 
South Carolina – S.C. CODE ANN. § 17-25-45 (2010) 
 
